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ERISA REFORM IN A POST-ENRON WORLD
JUSTIN CUMMINS* & MEG LUGER NIKOLAI * *

Washington has a rich history of catering to special and corporate
interests at the expense of ordinary citizens. Nowhere is this more
evident than in legislation dealing with company pensions.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pensions have existed since at least the zenith of the Roman
Empire, and have benefited an array of societies around the world
since then.' The United States government introduced the first
large-scale pension plan in the wake of the Civil War to benefit
veterans and widows.3 Through legislation enacted in 1890,
Congress extended these benefits to all veterans over 65, thereby
codifying the social-welfare function of pensions.4 In the following
decades, and through the leadership of labor unions, many state
and local governments as well as private corporations created
pension plans for their employees.5 By the 1970s, approximately

*Employment and civil rights lawyer; adjunct professor of law, University
of Minnesota Law School and William Mitchell College of Law. The author
thanks the other participants in the Fourth Annual Employee Benefits
Symposium and the excellent John Marshall law review staff for their
constructive comments. S.T.P.
** Employment and labor lawyer; J.D., University of Minnesota Law
School; B.A., University of Minnesota.
1. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Broken Promise, TIME, Oct. 31,
2005, at 42.
2. Dana M. Muir, Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee
Benefit Programs:Boomers, Benefits, and Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1351, 1357-62 (1997) (offering a history of pensions in the United States and
elsewhere). See also Kathleen H. Czarney, The Futureof Americans' Pensions:
Revamping Pension Plan Asset Allocation to Combat the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation's Deficit, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 153, 158-59 (2004)
(providing a historical overview of pension plans); H.J. Cummins, No More
Guarantees, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE Al, A22 (Sept. 25, 2005) (taking an
in-depth look into the pension crisis).
3. Muir, supra note 2, at 1358. See also Roger Lowenstein, The End of
Pensions?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 56, 64 (Oct. 30, 2005).
4. Muir, supra note 2, at 1358.
5. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 64; Cummins, supra note 2, at A22.
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one of two workers had a pension plan.6
For much of the Twentieth Century, in furtherance of the
New Deal's vision of collective responsibility, pensions enhanced
financial equity and security among the populace.7 At the dawn of
the Twenty-First Century, however, the United States' pension
system faces grave challenges.! The worsening problem harkens
back to recent financial fiascos that decimated the livelihoods of
millions. In particular, the accounting scandals of the 1990s as
well as the savings-and-loan disaster of the 1980s bear a striking
resemblance to the corporate misdeeds underlying the unfolding
In short, the lack of transparency and
pension crisis. 9
accountability that drove the corporate-governance and savingsand-loan scandals also underlies the emerging pension debacle.' °
The disintegration of the United States' pension system could
be even more devastating in its economic and social impact than
that of the financial scandals of the go-go 1980s and 1990s. As
both Congress and the courts have recognized, pensions play a
pivotal role in securing the economic and social well-being of tens
of millions of retirees and their families." It would be hard to
overstate the effect of thwarting the reasonable expectations and
rebuffing the concrete needs of such a large percentage of the
population. Yet, that is where we, as a nation, appear to be
headed should
immediate legislative and related judicial action
12
not occur.
Part I of this article describes in more detail the increasing
peril faced by the United States' pension system. Part I also

6. See generally Christian E. Weller & Laura Singleton, The Scandal
Beyond Enron: Pension coverage is shaky and dwindling. Will Congress Act?,
13 AM. PROSPECT 1, Sept. 23, 2002.
7. See, e.g., Muir, supra note 2, at 1357-62 (stating that private pension

plans grew rapidly between 1940 and 1970).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Parts I, III.
10. See infra Part III.

11. ERISA expressly recites the widespread and public value of pensions.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). The statute states, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of
employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial;

that the operational scope and economic impact of such plans is
increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these
plans; that they are affected with a national public interest; that they

have become an important factor affecting the stability of employment
and the successful development of industrial relations ...
Id. The Supreme Court has so recognized as well.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981).
12. See infra Part I.

See, e.g., Alessi v.
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explores the ramifications of allowing the status quo to continue
without appropriate corrective action.
Part II explains why much of the crisis in retirement equity
and security flows from procedural and substantive flaws codifieds
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").i
Part II also contextualizes the critique of ERISA by highlighting
the historical significance and underlying policy objectives of the
statute.
Part III draws parallels between the expanding pension
problem with the corporate-governance debacle of the 1990s and
early 2000s. In so doing, Part III outlines what we should expect
from retirement equity and security going forward in the absence
of radical ERISA reform.
Part IV analyzes pending legislation to amend ERISA that
purportedly would forestall the imminent pension disaster. Part
IV also identifies the material deficiencies of the proposed
amendments and then sets forth key elements of meaningful
ERISA reform in light of the recently implemented SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley). 4 The article concludes with
concrete legislative proposals that, if adopted, should ensure
greater retirement equity and security in the future.
For simplicity and clarity, this article focuses on the
trajectory of traditional private pensions in the United States.
Although common parlance frequently uses "pension" to refer to
401(k) and similar retirement savings accounts (often known as
defined-contribution plans), cash-balance plans, and annuities,
these savings instruments are actually distinct from traditional
pensions (typically referred to as defined-benefit plans) and were
not originally intended to replace traditional pensions. 5

13. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
14. Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley)
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in Sections of 11
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and other chapters).
15. Traditional pension plans usually entail monthly payments by a
company to its retired employees until they die, and the amount of the
payments are based on a formula involving the salary and years of service of a
given retiree. Cummins, supra note 2, at A23. See also Barlett, supra note 1,
at 44 (distinguishing traditional pension plans from 401(k) accounts and
similar savings vehicles). In contrast, 401(k), 403(b), Keogh, profit-sharing,
and other savings plans are individualized accounts to which employers may
or may not contribute and, in any event, the employer does not guarantee any
payments following retirement. Cummins, supra note 2, at A23. Cashbalance plans appear to be a cross between a defined-benefit plan and a
defined-contribution plan in that employees receive a lump sum payment from
their employers upon separation. Id. Annuities are purchased from insurance
companies to guarantee a regular stream of income for the life of the
beneficiary, so it is akin to a privatized defined-benefit pension. Id.
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Accordingly, the ensuing analysis addresses these other financial
devices only to the extent necessary to explicate the operation and
limitations of the existing traditional pension system under
ERISA. In addition, although this article focuses on singleemployer pension plans, the analysis set forth below should apply
to multi-employer pension plans with equal force.
II. THE GROWING PENSION CRISIS:
AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISASTER IN THE MAKING
Although increasing numbers of legal commentators,
investigative journalists, and financial analysts have begun to
document the catastrophic direction in which the pension system
is spiraling, policy makers have taken few meaningful steps to
avoid the looming pension catastrophe."6 Consequently, the courts
continue to be unnecessarily constrained in taking sufficient
declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive action."
The apparent Congressional paralysis seems to result, in
part, from internal inconsistencies that have afflicted the
administration of ERISA itself."
Indeed, ERISA embodies the

16. Nicholas J. Brannick, At the Crossroadsof Three Codes: How Employers
are Using ERISA, the Tax Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade their Pension
Obligations, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1577 (2004); David Keating, Pension Insurance,
Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 65 (1991). See also Dana M.
Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA
Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 444 (2000) (advocating
extension of ERISA's principle of ensuring benefits to issues of benefit
administration); Barlett, supra note 1, at 38 (suggesting that the PBGC is "on
the brink of financial ruin").
17. See generally Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999)
(holding that material, ex-post-facto alterations of the pension plan structure
did not implicate any fiduciary duty or violate ERISA); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 107 (1989) (imposing great deference to the
broad discretion of pension plan administrators). Leading scholars have
observed that the courts construe ERISA's provisions in narrow terms that fail
to recognize the realities of funding and administering pension plans. See,
e.g., Muir, supra note 2, at 1417-18 (recognizing that this highly conservative
approach may be due, in part, to the perception that courts are drowning in
ERISA claims).
18. Congress embraced two conflicting goals when adopting ERISA: first,
protecting the interests of pension plan beneficiaries and second, encouraging
plan sponsorship by containing costs. Colleen E. Medill, The Individual
Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to
Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 63-66 (2000); Muir, supra note 2, at 1415. See also
Barlett, supra note 1, at 42 (reporting the ethically compromised nature of
Congress in adopting and, subsequently, amending ERISA). The Supreme
Court has specifically recognized the competing interests vis-a-vis pension
plans under ERISA. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). See also
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993) (recognizing that
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tension between the New Deal legacy of collective responsibility
and the New Right's opposition to "big government regulation"
that purportedly raises the cost of doing business. 9 Regardless of
the reasons, Congressional inaction and the related judicial
disengagement are worrisome. Given the magnitude of the assets
involved and the millions of families affected by the fate of the
United States' pension system, the stakes are high. °
A. The GatheringThreat to Pensions in the United States
A growing number of companies face stark financial
circumstances given the condition of their pension plans. 1 Indeed,
many were not surprised when, in October 2005, Delphi sought
protection under the bankruptcy code via the largest filing ever in
the auto industry." On the heels of this troubling development,
Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines filed for bankruptcy
The pension obligations likely
virtually simultaneously."
discharged via bankruptcy by Delta and Northwest alone amount

ERISA "resolved innumerable disputes between powerful competing
interests"); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981)
(noting the tension between benefiting employees and "containing pension
costs").
19. On the one hand, ERISA seeks to promote a more equitable and secure
future via pension plans; on the other hand, ERISA does not require that
pension plans be provided. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 515. For further discussion in
this regard see infra Part II.
20. See Jane D. Bailey, Tenth Circuit Survey: ERISA Preemption, 74 DENV.
U. L. REV. 473, 473 (1997); Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The
Window of Vulnerability for Surviving Spouses Under ERISA, 76 IOWA L. REV.
431, 433 n.12 (1991) (emphasizing the "escalating importance" of private
retirement).
21. See Cummins, supra note 2, at A22-23 (documenting the expanding
pension crisis). See also Adam Geller, Accounting Change May Squeeze Some
available
at
Jan.
18,
2006,
Pensions,
S.F.
EXAMINER,
http://www.sfexaminer.com/articles/2006/01/19/
business/20060119_buO3_acct.txt (discussing the freezing of pensions by Sears
Holding Co., Hewlett-Packard Co., and other large corporations); Michael
Brush, 40 companies sitting on pension time bombs, MONEY, Aug. 25, 2004
(identifying the 20 corporations with the greatest disparity between their
unfunded pension obligations and their market capitalization as well as the 20
companies that obtain the largest portion of their net income on assumed
returns on their pension investments); Bernard Condon, The Coming Pension
Crisis, FORBES, Aug. 12, 2004 (illustrating the growing problem of pension
obligations exceeding the liquidated value of pension providers).
22. Barlett, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing the reasons for, and impact of,
bankruptcy filings by Delphi and other large corporations).
23. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 56. See also Peter G. Gosselin, How
Bedrock Promises of Security Have FracturedAcross America, L.A. TIMES Al,
Dec. 30, 2005, at Al (describing the demise of Delphi's pension plan and its
social impact).
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to nearly $20 billion. '
In theory, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
("PBGC")n safeguards private pension benefits even in cases of
such large-scale bankruptcies."
In practice, the PBGC labors
under a deficit of approximately $30 billion. 7 Moreover, the
Congressional Budget Office forecasts that, without corrective
action, the PBGC deficit will explode to a mind-numbing $100
billion by 2025, if not sooner.28 Even if the PBGC were fully
funded, the agency would not necessarily insure 100 percent of
private pension benefits.
The PBGC caps disbursements to
beneficiaries at approximately $47,000 annually, and the PBGC
has even cancelled an array of benefits that it supposedly
guarantees under the governing statutory scheme.29
The systematic erosion of private pensions does not end,
however, with bankruptcy. ° The PBGC has cut deals with
companies, such as United Airlines, to terminate long-standing

24. Significantly, companies like Northwest have devoted substantial
resources, including aggressive lobbying muscle, to reduce their pension
obligations beyond the bankruptcy context. Greg Gordon, Pension aid bill
offers playbook of lobbying muscle by NWA, Al, A14 (Dec. 30, 2005). See also
Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 56.
25. The PBGC is a creature of statute, regulating private pension providers
and insuring pension benefits pursuant to ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302;
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1990) ("PBGC
is a wholly owned United States Government corporation... modeled after
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Board of Directors of the
PBGC consists of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and Commerce.").
Technically, the PBGC has legal authority to commence enforcement actions
and otherwise ensure full compliance with ERISA. Id. In an increasingly
conservative pro-corporate environment with declining resources, the PBGC
has not been an active regulator as of late. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 3,
at 56 (indicating that the PBGC is now in a $23 billion deficit).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(3)(B)(iii) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
27. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 56. See also Cummins, supra note 3, at
A22-23 (noting recent airline and steel company bankruptcies).
For an
excellent illustration of the limited protection afforded by the PBGC, see
generally, Keating, supra note 16, at 65 (adopting a moral hazard analysis in
the PBGC scheme).
28. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 56.
29. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 637-38 (reaffirming the
validity of the limitations of insurance protection provided by the PBGC);
Barlett, supra note 1, at 40 (noting that the PBGC unilaterally voided
substantial benefits, including employee
stock-ownership plans and
retirement health care coverage).
30. See Cummins, supra note 2, at A22-23 (illustrating the broad scope of
the threat to pension plans). See also Stephanie Armour, et al., Even Healthy
Firms Freeze or Cut Loose TraditionalPensions, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2005, at
B1 (outlining the growing abandonment of traditional pension plans by United
States corporations).

20061

ERISA Reform in a Post-EnronWorld

pension plans in the name of averting bankruptcy in the first
place.31 In addition, healthy companies like IBM have recently
announced they are unilaterally freezing or otherwise denying
pension benefits."
The move by IBM and Verizon
Communications, Inc., standing alone, has resulted in frozen
benefits for nearly 200,000 employees.' That IBM, among other
corporations, has taken such drastic action is noteworthy as it has
perhaps the largest pension plan in the nation and is "widely
considered a bellwether on benefits issues, as many companies
tend to follow its lead."34
The deleterious direction of public pensions mirrors the
pernicious trajectory of private plans. Essentially underwritten by
taxpayers, public pensions basically enjoy insurance coverage by
state and local governments.35
Notably, the swelling public
pension obligations have, in effect, bankrupted the City of San
Diego and put numerous other state and local governments on
that path in Illinois, New York, Ohio, West Virginia, and
elsewhere.'
The chronic and deepening underfunding of both private and
public pensions has precipitated much of the pending and

31. See In re UAL Corp., 428 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding the
legality of the agreement between the PBGC and United to terminate the
pension plan without consent from pension beneficiaries). See also Allied
Pilots Ass'n v. PBGC, 334 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (approving a similar
agreement between the PBGC and TWA Airlines); Pamela A. MacLean, A
Savvy Way to Trim Pensions: United Gets Around Bankruptcy Laws, THE
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 7, 2005 (explaining how United used existing laws to
minimize its pension responsibilities).
32. Stephanie Armour, IBM to Freeze Pension Program: Company
Considered Pacesetteron Benefits, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2006, at Al. See also
Barlett, supra note 1, at 38 (observing that approximately one-third of the
Fortune 1000 companies froze or ended their pension plans between 2001 and
2004 and that IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Sears, Motorola, and other large
corporations stopped offering defined-benefit pensions to new employees).
33. See generally, Mary Williams Walsh, More Companies Ending Promises
for Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, January 9, 2006, at Al (discussing the disturbing
trend among corporations regarding pensions); Albert B. Crenshaw, IBM Adds
its Name to List of Firms Freezing Pensions, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2006, at Al
(reporting that some surveys indicate that approximately twenty percent of
employers with pension plans are considering freezing or terminating those
plans). See also, Armour, supra note 32, at 1A (indicating IBM has one of the
nation's largest pension plans).
34. Armour, supra note 32, at 1A. See also Crenshaw, supra note 33, at Al
(adding that IBM joins a growing list of U.S. employers that have frozen or
terminated pension plans).
35. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 60.
36. Barlett, supra note 1, at 34-35; Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 60. See
also Armour, supra note 30, at B1 (discussing pension management programs
in today's economy).
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threatened defaults on plan obligations. Private pensions are $450
billion in the red, while public pensions may be as much as $700
billion in the hole. 37 The rapid decline in companies that even
provide pensions has aggravated the impact of this widespread
under funding. Only one in five companies now provide pensions;
a fifty percent drop since 1980.8
As discussed more fully below in Parts II and III, the near
abandonment of pension obligations essentially has been endorsed
by the federal government and effectively concealed from the
public by pension administrators. For instance, the PBGC allowed
Bethlehem Steel to forego funding its pension plan during the
three-year run up to the unloading of Bethlehem's pension
obligations onto the federal government in 2001.39 Similarly, the
PBGC permitted United Airlines to stop contributing to its plans
during the three years leading up to its bankruptcy filing in 2003.0
Pension administrators have hidden this structural underfunding
by employing a number of accounting gimmicks, including using
improperly high discount rates to "calculate" future pension
obligations' and misleadingly using "credit-balances."42
In short, the pension system seems fundamentally broken and
headed over a cliff. To confirm this, one need look no further than
the Director of the PBGC - the very same person who served as
counsel to the Senate Banking Committee that responded too little
and too late to the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s. In June
2005, PBGC Director Bradley Belt acknowledged structural
problems with the pension regime when testifying before Congress
about recent defaults on obligations: "United, US Airways,
Bethlehem Steel, LTV, and National Steel would not have

37. Barlett, supra note 1, at 38; Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 58, 74.
38. Armour, supra note 32, at 1A. See also Crenshaw, supra note 33, at Al
(indicating that most of the decline has come from small employers);
Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 56 (describing the shrinking pension system).
39. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 72. Many commentators have argued that
the systematic underfunding of pension plans is the inevitable outcome of the
moral hazard embodied in ERISA. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 14, at 69-78
(exploring the roles of pension plans, ERISA, and the PBGC).
40. Lowenstein, supra note 3; at 72.
41. The unprincipled use of discounting rates can transform corporate
liabilities into purported assets. See infra, Part II.C. See also, Barlett, supra
note 1, at 44 (outlining how ERISA and PBGC regulations allow corporations
to manipulate the calculation of pension assets and obligations in ways that
obscure actual financial circumstances).
42. The cynical manipulation of balance sheets in this way can distort the
reporting of actual financial standing. See infra, Part I.C. See also,
Cummins, supra note 2, at A22 (describing the frequently used practice of
"wearing away" pension obligations by altering the formula for determining
employee's monthly payments upon retirement).
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presented claims in excess of $1 billion each - and with funded
ratios of less than 50 percent - if the rules worked."43
B. The Likely Economic and Social Consequences
of a CollapsedPension System
The recent defaults by several high-profile companies raise
the specter of a chain-reaction that would create a grim future.
The demise of large corporations like Bethlehem and Northwest
has intensified the demand on PBGC's resources to bailout
troubled funds.'
Given its grossly underfunded condition, the
PBGC will be unable to insure pension benefits to the extent
required, especially as more corporations default going forward.45
In addition to frustrating the reasonable expectations of tens
of millions of beneficiaries, this situation will likely undermine
consumer confidence.
This will, in turn, materially impede
economic growth." Many beneficiaries, deprived of resources they
need to live, will suffer and probably become more dependent on
social security and other public programs at a time when such
programs will already be under substantial stress.47
In other words, the currently poor financial health of pension
plans will ultimately translate into millions more families
struggling simply to meet their basic needs in the context of a
stagnant economy. A recent investigation on the state of pensions
put it bluntly: "decisions by Congress favoring corporate and

43. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 72. See also Barlett, supra note 1, at 44
(noting that the PBGC currently faces a record 350 active bankruptcy cases).
44. See Barlett, supra note 1, at 44 (outlining the increasing financial
demands on the PBGC); Cummins, supra note 2, at A22 (reporting the
underfunded nature of the PBGC and its related inability to address the
growing pension crisis).
45. Id. See also Keating, supra note 16, at 76-78 (highlighting the
limitations of the PBGC).
46. It is axiomatic that sharp declines in consumer confidence undermine
economic growth.
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 96-99 (5th ed., 1991) (observing

that market demand drops when individual consumer demand decreases).
Although on a smaller scale, the economic fallout from the savings-and-loan
and accounting scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, gives some idea
of the likely impact of a pension collapse. See, e.g., Barlett, supra note 1, at 47
(describing the savings-and-loan bailout and explaining why a bailout of
pensions would be much more costly).
47. Cummins, supra note 2, at A22-23 (describing the abandonment of
pension by corporations and its adverse impact on families). See also Gosselin,
supra note 23, at Al (highlighting the hardships imposed on employees of
companies that do not honor their pension obligations); Armour, supra note
30, at B1 (describing the vulnerable position of employees in the face of
pension-benefits cuts).
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special interests over workers will drive millions of older
Americans - a majority of them women - into poverty, push
millions more to the brink and turn retirement years into a time of
need for everyone but the affluent."'
Likewise, the impact of public pension obligations portends a
bleak future. Recent developments in the City of San Diego offer a
glimpse of what lies in store for state and local governments if the
pension regime continues on its current path. San Diego, much
like many other jurisdictions around the country, has soaring
pension obligations. These financial commitments have induced
the slashing of municipal services such as needed water, library,
sewer, and parks projects. 9 Quite obviously, such radical shifts in
public-resource allocation will have a negative impact on the local
economy and quality of life for all residents - whether or not they
are public-pension beneficiaries. Given the sizable and expanding
magnitude of public-pension commitments, the restriction or
outright elimination of key services may not prevent ultimate
default.
In other words, state and local jurisdictions may
experience the worst of both worlds: simultaneously eviscerating
public services as they head toward eventual pension default.
Whether pensions are public or private, their sharp decline
will surely exacerbate the socio-economic inequality that exists in
the United States. ° At the time of this aggressive reduction in
pension benefits and stagnant pay for regular employees, the
compensation for chief executive officers has risen on average from
approximately $3 million to nearly $12 million; a compensation
ratio of more than 400 to 1 in favor of executives. 1 Indeed, the
United States has the unfortunate distinction of being the most
stratified nation in the industrialized world.52
Further

48. Barlett, supra note 1, at 38.
49. Id. at 34-35; Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 58-60.
50. See generally TAMARA DRAUT, ET AL., INEQUALITY MATTERS: THE
GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND ITS POISONOUS CONSEQUENCES
(2005) (analyzing the ramifications of the deepening inequity in the United
States); EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING
INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 51-57 (1995); Clifford Cobb, et al., If the
GDP is Up, Why is America Down?, ATL. MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, at 59, 72; Keith
Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1995, at Al. See also Barlett, supra note 1, at 44 (arguing that millions of
Americans will be forced into poverty during retirement).
51. See generally Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. to Require More Disclosure on
Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at Al (explaining how the increase

in disclosure required by the SEC is not likely to affect executive
compensation); Draut, supra note 50 (providing an incisive exposition and

critique of the intensifying inequality in the United States).
52. See generally Draut, supra note 50; Wolff, supra note 50, at 51-57; Cobb,
supra note 50, at 72; Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in
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intensifying this inequality will only invite greater economic and
social instability, and will inflict unnecessary harm on tens of
millions in this country.3
Importantly, 401(k) accounts and other individualized savings
vehicles do not appear to offer the needed salvation in the
prevailing environment.
Aside from being much riskier for
beneficiaries, these alternative financial instruments have not
prompted significant savings.'
In truth, the median value of
401(k) accounts in the United States is less than $18,000, and
approximately 25 percent of these alternative savings vehicles
have a balance of less than $5,000."

III. ERISA's DREAM DEFERRED
Although the political establishment had been moving
increasingly
toward
an
"individualized"
conception
of
responsibility and welfare by the 1970s, Congress nonetheless
embraced, at least in part, core New Deal values when it enacted
ERISA in 1974.6 Indeed, specific New Deal initiatives, such as the
Social Security Act, 7 appear to have paved the way for ERISA by
more broadly codifying retirement insurance in response to the
Great Depression.'
The New Deal Era, over which Franklin D. Roosevelt presided
in the 1930s and 1940s, included an unprecedented wave of
legislation and other governmental initiatives aimed at improving
the general economic and social welfare in the nation.59 New Deal

West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al. See also Barlett, supra note 1, at 44
(discussing the lack of adequate funding of most state public employee pension

plans).
53. The threat to pension benefits recently induced the shutdown of New
York City's massive public-transportation system during the economically and
socially critical holiday season. Adam Geller, Friction over pension plans won't
be likely to go away soon, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Dec. 29, 2005, at D7. See
also Joshua B. Freeman, A Fight for the Future, THE NATION, Dec. 22, 2005
(describing the impetus and impact of the New York City transit system
workers' strike).
54. Barlett, supra note 1, at 47.
55. Id. Although 401(k) plans are a comparatively newer mechanism for
retirement savings, the median value of those accounts is still appallingly low.
56. Jennifer Klein, The Politics of Economic Security: Employee Benefits

and the Privatizationof New Deal Liberalism, 16 J. POL'Y HIST. 34, 58 (2004).
57. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
58. See Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (Christopher Tomlins & Michael
Grossberg,
eds.)
(forthcoming),
available
at
http'//www.law.bepress.conuvalwps/uva-publiclaw/art23 (providing an up to
date discussion of the legal developments during this era).
59. Id.
See Martha McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:
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legislation typically turned on a notion of mutual responsibility
and well-being as well as the conviction that the government plays
a vital role in protecting workers and constructively regulating
economic relationships.' As set forth more fully below, this more
progressive view of responsibility, general welfare, and
governmental action informed the fashioning of ERISA. Yet, the
promise of ERISA has not been fully realized due to structural
limitations embedded in the statute.
A.

The Compelling Purposes of ERISA

ERISA's statutory scheme embodies several key and
interrelated goals. First, Congress sought to promote equity for
employees as they planned for and lived out their retirement.
Second, ERISA
purports
to ensure transparency
and
accountability in the operation of pension plans. These objectives
also provide the means for achieving the first and third goals of
ERISA. Third, Congress intended to maximize financial security
for retirees and their families.
1.

Promotion of Equity

Enacted more than forty years after the inception of the New
Deal, ERISA represents one of the last pieces of comprehensive
legislation founded on principles of collective responsibility among
workers and their employers.
Quite obviously, ERISA has
enhanced fairness by expanding the availability of pension
benefits to ordinary employees."'
The statute has also secured greater equity by enabling
employees to order their affairs based on the reasonable
expectation that retirement savings, in the form of employersponsored pension plans, will be a source of income in their later
years.62 As a corollary, ERISA seems directed at minimizing

Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 817
(2003) (observing that the New Deal sprung from a broad-based movement
that demanded public- and private-sector support of workers and their
families as well as a measure of economic autonomy and democracy in the
United States).
60. McCluskey, supra note 59, 817-22.
61. See generally Weller, supra note 6, at 1 (observing that approximately
half of employees in the United States had a pension by the late 1970s). See
also H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641
("In 1940, an estimated four million employees were covered by private
pensions plans; in 1950, the figure had increased to almost 10 million and in
1960 over 21 million were covered. Currently [in 1974], over 30 million
employees.., are covered by these plans.").
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) states:
[O]wing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the
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demands on the government for retirement income.63 Indeed, the
collective value of ERISA plans is enormous.' Thus, frustrating
pension beneficiaries' reasonable expectations would adversely
affect not only beneficiaries and their families, but the country as
a whole.65
2.

Promotion of Transparencyand Accountability

According to its terms, ERISA increases the clarity and
integrity with which employers administer their pension plans. In
this regard, ERISA supposedly represents a substantial
improvement over its predecessor legislation, the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act ("WPPDA"). 66
Like ERISA, the
WPPDA focused on improving the disclosure of data to plan
participants.67 As critics of this legislation noted, however, the

soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay
promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of
plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and
their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that
it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and
to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be
provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their
financial soundness.
See also Frank Cummings, ERISA: The Reasonable Expectations Bill, 65 TAX
NOTEs 880, 881 (1994) ("[ERISA] was, at its core, a 'reasonable expectations'
bill. It gave an ordinary employee the assured right to receive what a
reasonable person in his boots would have expected in the circumstances.
Primarily, it was a consumer protection bill").
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) ("[I]t is... desirable in the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States,
and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be
provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial
soundness").
64. See Watson, supra note 20, at 433 n.12 (estimating the total value of all
pension plans at approximately $2.5 trillion dollars and noting that "[tihis
represents more than one-half of the investment capital in [the United
States]"); see also Bailey, supra note 20, at 473 (reporting that employee
benefits account for more than one quarter of private employers' compensation
costs).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4640 ("The dynamic asset growth necessary to meet its responsibilities has
placed the private pension system in a position to influence the level of
savings, the operation of our capital markets, and the relative financial
security of millions of consumers, three of the fundamental elements of our
national economic security.").
66. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1974).
67. H.R. REP. No. 85-2283 (1958) ("[The WPPDA] is designed to place the
primary responsibility for the policing and improved operations of these plans
upon the participants and beneficiaries themselves, with a minimum of
interference in the natural development and operation of such plans, reserving
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WPPDA contained virtually no guidance concerning what
participants could do with the information.'
Significantly, ERISA added enforcement mechanisms for
private parties to the already-existing disclosure requirements of
the WPPDA. In other words, ERISA technically mandates both
transparency and accountability.69 The statute requires pension
plans to be written and available to beneficiaries, and ERISA
mandates that participants receive notice of events that would
have a material impact on benefits." These disclosures, in theory,
should enable aggrieved pension beneficiaries to pursue
enforcement actions and, therefore, to ensure accountability for
any wrongdoing."
3. Promotionof Security
As the name of the statute itself confirms, Congress intended
to protect the financial well-being of retirees through its adoption

to the States the detailed regulations relating to insurance and trusts, and
other phases of their operations, and to place the least possible burden by way
of cost and otherwise upon the plans and the taxpayers in general"). For an
in-depth analysis of the legislation see Anthony Abato, Jr., The Welfare and
Pension Plan DisclosureAct - Its History, Operation,and Amendment, 30 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 682 (1962) (analyzing investigations and legislation leading up
to the WPPDA).
68. See, e.g., Nola A. Kohler, An Overview of the Inconsistency Among the
Circuits Concerning the Conflict of Interest Analysis Applied in an ERISA
Action with an Emphasis on the Eighth Circuit'sAdoption of the Sliding Scale
Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corporation, 75 N. DAK. L. REV. 815, 819 (1999)
(outlining the weaknesses inherent in the WPPDA's structure).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(7)(F)(vi)(2000) (requiring the provision of notice to
plan participants regarding the deferral of funding liabilities); 29 U.S.C. §
1132 (2000) (creating a private right of action to enforce pension rights).
70. Duggan v. Hobbs, 99 F.3d 307, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a
primary purpose of ERISA is to ensure the integrity and primacy of the
written plans); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1170 (3rd
Cir. 1990) (observing that the ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements
are designed "to ensure that the individual participant knows exactly where
he stands with respect to the plan and to enable employees to police their
plans"); Rucker v. Pacific FM, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (N.D. Cal 1992)
(stating that "Congress enacted ERISA 'to safeguard the well-being and
security of working men and women and apprise them of their rights and
obligations under any employee benefit plan'); see also James E.
Holloway, The PracticalEntry and Utility of a Legal-ManagerialFramework
Without the Economic Analysis of Law, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 131, 185 (2002)
(noting that the "two... purposes behind ERISA's reporting and disclosure
provisions... ensure that the individual participant knows exactly where he
stands with respect to the plan and ... enable employees to police their
plans").
71. Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992).
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of ERISA. Congress included several items in the statutory
For example, ERISA
scheme to further pension security.
establishes fixed vesting rights for plan participants, eliminating
confusion about when and to what extent pension benefits will be
protected.72 In addition, the statute creates minimum funding
requirements for pension plans and maintains an insurance
program for those plans to ensure that pension obligations will be
honored.73 Moreover, ERISA imposes fiduciary responsibilities on
plan administrators. "
B. The ProceduralDeficiencies of the Statutory Scheme
Security and equity have not been fully realized under the
ERISA regime. Much of this flows from structural shortcomings of
the statute that have thwarted the project of achieving real
transparency and accountability.
Although the distinction
between procedural and substantive flaws is frequently dubious,7"
particularly with respect to ERISA, the analysis below considers
these two categories separately to highlight significant deficiencies
of the legal framework governing pensions.
Notably, conflicts of interest underlie the flaws set forth below
because, at bottom, employers have primary control over the
disclosure of pension rights, the interpretation of those rights, and
the review of those interpretations.
1. Flawed Disclosure Procedures
The Summary Plan Description ("SPD") constitutes perhaps
the most important tool under ERISA for promoting transparency
of pension administration." The SPD supposedly describes plans
in a way that is "sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to
reasonably apprise beneficiaries of their rights under the plan."77
Accordingly, employees rely on SPDs to understand what benefits
they will receive and when they will receive them."

72. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2000).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2000). The PBGC guarantees benefits up to
approximately $47,000 per year for plans that terminate in distress. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, PBGC Announces Maximum Insurance Benefit
for 2006, Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/2005/pro609.html. The cap is lower for employees who retire before the age of 65. Id.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1101.
75. See Martha Minow, Politics and Procedure, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:

PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 79 (David Kairys ed., 1998) (providing a cogent
analysis of the substantial overlap between substance and procedure in the

context of civil litigation).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1022.
77. Id.
78. See Michael A. Valenza, Accuracy is Not a Lot to Ask: Decisions in the
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Unfortunately, SPDs are neither models of simplicity nor
accessibility, and they are not particularly useful to beneficiaries."9
In fact, SPDs and other pension-disclosure documents appear to be
nearly as opaque and Byzantine as the provisions of ERISA itself. 0
The lack of clarity around the meaning of SPDs and related
disclosures mandated by ERISA has had a substantive impact on
pension rights. For example, plan participants may be denied
benefits if the SPD's language could be read as conflicting with the
plan's lengthy and more technical terms.'
In any event, some
courts hold that ERISA plans have no affirmative duty to disclose
benefits changes to pension beneficiaries."
2,

Flawed Administrative Procedures

ERISA creates an administrative review process that
concerning
pension
dramatically
reduces
accountability
For instance, pension plans can reserve for
obligations.'

Second and Third Circuits Set the Tone for Litigation Over Conflicts Between
ERISA Plan Documents and Summaries, 6 TRANSACTIONS 361, 362 (Spring
2005) (recognizing that SPDs are the only materials available for employees to
consult when making decisions regarding benefits).
79. See, e.g., Peter Weidenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and
"Plans",72 WASH. U. L.Q. 559, 574 (1994) (noting the tension between the
purpose of SPDs and the implementation of actual plan terms such that
information is often disclosed when it is no longer useful for decision-making).
80. See Ann C. Bertino, The Need for a Mandatory Award of Attorney's Fees
for PrevailingPlaintiffs in ERISA Benefits Cases, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 904
n. 253 (1992) ("ERISA is so complex that many attorney's hesitate to learn the
statute. It is unrealistic to expect that the average lay person could enforce
his or her rights under ERISA without assistance."). See also Pamela Perun &
C. Eugene Steuerle, ERISA at 50: A New Model for the Private Pension
System, the Retirement Project, Occasional Paper No. 4 (2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=236838 (discussing the complexity of ERISA and
Internal Revenue Code provisions governing pensions).
81. Courts have required beneficiaries to meet a very high evidentiary
standard - "actual" reliance on SPD language - before they can seek legal
relief for the denial of benefits. See, e.g., Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d
1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a beneficiary must prove reliance on
a plan summary in order to prevent an employer from enforcing inconsistent
terms). See also, Michael Joyce Setting a Standard to Rely On: ERISA Benefit
Claims Where the Summary Plan Description and Plan Document Conflict, 90
IOWA L. REV. 765, 769 (2005) (proposing that courts should adopt a prejudice
standard requiring the beneficiary to prove "likely" harm and giving the
sponsor the opportunity to rebut).
82. Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 1996). See also
Joseph Czerniawski, Bins v. Exxon: Affirmative Duties to Disclose Proposed
Benefits Changes in the Absence of Employee Inquiry, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
783 (2001) (examining the scope of duties owed by an ERISA fiduciary).
83. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (providing for an establishment of a plan with
optional features that, if employed, would reduce accountability).
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themselves largely unfettered discretion in making benefits
determinations pursuant to ERISA.'
By the same token,
beneficiaries must exhaust an appeals process that ordinarily
reaffirms the initial decision."5 In other words, even if an employer
or plan administrator violated certain pension rights, there may be
no meaningful recourse unless a beneficiary commences a costly
and difficult private action in court.
3. Flawed Enforcement Procedures
ERISA authorizes individual civil actions for beneficiaries to
sue for damages and injunctive relief to recover benefits, to clarify
rights to future benefits, and to enforce rights under pension
plans.'
The courts' application of ERISA, however, has not
necessarily provided more rigorous scrutiny of pension
administration than the review process addressed above. Given
the Supreme Court's wooden interpretation of ERISA in Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, most companies now use plan
language that confers on administrators broad discretion in
construing and applying pension rights. 7
This precedent
effectively precludes courts from reviewing plan decisions under88
anything but a highly deferential "abuse of discretion" standard.
In short, the denial of benefits and alleged pension
mismanagement will essentially only be scrutinized when a
palpable conflict of interest can be established.89 Thus, ERISA's

84. See, e.g., Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants:
PracticalAssessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 723, 762 n. 230 (1994) (identifying "the absence of any impartial
administrative review process applicable to ERISA benefits claims").
85. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural
Rules of Pursuing an ERISA Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REV. 329, 361 (2001)
(noting that "all the circuits require the claimant to exhaust administrative
procedures prior to litigating an ERISA benefits claim"); Lorraine Schmall,
Toward Full Participationand Protection of the Worker with Illness: The
Failureof Federal Health Law After McGann v. H & H Music Co., 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 781, 829 (1994) (highlighting the perfunctory nature of the
ERISA appeals procedures).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A-B).
87. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (holding that a denial of benefits under
ERISA is reviewed under a de novo standard unless the employer's pension
plan gave the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the plan's terms).
88. Id. at 112-13.
89. See, e.g., Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1006-07
(10th Cir. 2004) (applying a heightened standard of scrutiny to an employer's
denial of employee's benefits because there was an inherent conflict of
interest); Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1161-62 (8th Cir. 1998).
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fiduciary obligations have been largely eviscerated in practice,"
rendering the substantive accountability provisions virtually
impotent at the outset.9
The demonstrated judicial deference to plan administrators
under ERISA takes on greater significance given the statute does
not explicitly guarantee a right to a jury trial.' Even if the courts
that have concluded ERISA confers such a right ultimately win
the day,93 judges will continue to play an important role in
evaluating the merits of ERISA claims, absent Congressional
reform, for the foreseeable future.
ERISA's approach to attorney fees is also problematic. Unlike
most other employment-related statutes - such as Title VII,94 the
Fair Labor Standards Act,95 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,' the Family and Medical Leave Act,' and
Section 19819 - the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff is not necessarily available under ERISA." The Tenth

90. See generally Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in
ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 1083 (2001) (analyzing the
limited protection afforded by the fiduciary obligation under ERISA). See also
Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of
ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 412 (2000) (discussing
the Firestone decision and noting that "the effect of drafting plan documents
explicitly to grant interpretive discretion to decision makers has come to be a
complex amalgam of shield and sword").
91. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by 'Equitable': The Supreme
Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1317, 1319 (2003) (characterizing ERISA's importation of fiduciary and loyalty
principles from trust law as substantive concerning "all aspects of plan
administration"); H. Brent McKnight, Assessing the Impact of Conflict of
Interest on the Decisions of ERISA Fiduciaries,13 REGENT U.L. REV. 1, 3
(2001) (noting that, under Firestone, a conflict of interest is only a factor to be
considered in reviewing for an abuse of discretion).
92. See, e.g., Mathews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir.
1998); Sofo v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1994).
93. Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-thinking Firestone in Light of Great-West Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in Welfare
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 694 (2004) (concluding that
courts have erroneously found that pension claims are equitable and,
consequently, not subject to a jury trial and observing, further, that several
courts have ruled ERISA claims are legal and nature such that they warrant
jury trials).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17.
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
96. 29 U.S.C. 33 621-634.
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
98. 42 U.S.C. §1981.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Technically, the standard for awarding fees
under ERISA resembles that of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2412, so that the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees unless the
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Circuit has set forth the governing formula for determining
whether a prevailing party can receive a fees award.'"° The factors
that a court must consider are as follows: (1) the degree of the
offending parties' "culpability"; (2) the degree of the offending
parties' ability to satisfy personally an award of attorney's fees; (3)
whether or not an award of attorney's fees against the offending
parties would deter other persons acting under similar
circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit conferred on members of
the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the
parties' positions. 1
In effect, courts apply the heightened
standard for the award of punitive damages to the award of
attorney's fees, which traditionally have been automatic for
prevailing plaintiffs in employment-related cases."u
Exacerbating matters, some courts have read ERISA to
authorize the award of attorney's fees to defendants if a plan
participant does not prevail.0 3 This is virtually unprecedented in
the nation's jurisprudence and amounts to the adoption of the
"English Rule" in the ERISA context."u The remarkable legal
exposure created for plaintiffs by ERISA's approach to attorney's
fees will likely continue to have a chilling effect on enforcement

position of losing party was substantially justified or special circumstances
make the award unjust. Hooper v Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287, 293-94 (7th Cir.
1994); but see Stanton v. Larry Fowler Trucking., 52 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1995)
(finding that the losing defendant bears burden of showing special
circumstances that would preclude award of attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff).
100. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 464-65 (10th Cir. 1978). Each Circuit has
applied a version of the Eaves test. See, e.g., Gray v. New England Tel. &
Telegraph Co, 792 F.2d 251, 257-58 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying a version of the
Eaves test); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. New York State Teamsters Council
Health & Hosp. Fund, 903 F.2d 919, 923-24 (2nd Cir. 1990); Ellison v.
Shenango Inc. Pension Board, 956 F.2d 1268, 1273 (3rd Cir. 1992);
Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (4th Cir.
1993); Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir.
1980); Tiemeyer v. Cmty. Mutual Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1094, 1101 (6th Cir. 1993);
Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 369-70 (7th Cir. 1988); Lawrence v. Westerhaus,
749 F.2d 494, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1984); Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d
446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 961-62 (11th
Cir. 1986); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
101. Eaves, 587 F.2d at 464-65.
102. For an analysis of the comparatively higher threshold for obtaining
punitive damages, see State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Kolstad v.
Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
103. Helfrich v. Carle Ass'n, P.S., 328 F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2003); Credit
Managers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 743, 747 (9th
Cir. 1994).
104. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269-70
(1975) (rejecting the "English Rule" of awarding attorney's fees to defendants).
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activity. 5
Paralleling the restriction on the award of attorney's fees,
courts have construed ERISA not to provide punitive damages,
especially for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.1"
The basic
rationale for this narrow approach holds that ERISA claims are
essentially contractual in nature, and courts prefer not to award
"extra-contractual" remedies. 7
The Sixth Circuit has gone
further, proclaiming that even compensatory damages are not
available as a remedy for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. 8
Class-action litigation could help mitigate the adverse impact
of the preceding flaws with ERISA's enforcement procedure.
Courts do not appear disposed, however, to make ERISA class
actions readily available."° In addition, the litigation around class
certification can be cost-prohibitive and time-consuming.
C. The Substantive Deficiencies of the Statutory Scheme
As some scholars have observed, ERISA does not mandate a
minimum level of benefits."0 Nor does it require employers to
actually sponsor a pension plan.'
However, ERISA does contain

105. For analysis of the chilling effect, see Ann C. Bertino, The Need for a
Mandatory Award of Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Plaintiffs in ERISA
Benefits cases, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 905 n. 253 (1992).
106. See Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)
(holding that individual plan participants have no right of action for extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages regarding breach-of-fiduciaryduty claims); but see Muir, supra note 90, at 445 (discussing the Russell
decision and concluding that its comments about damages are merely dicta);
William M. Acker, Jr., Can the Courts Rescue ERISA?, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 285,
295 (1999).
107. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144.
108. See Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 21 F.3d 1381, 1390 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding
that Section 1132(a)(2) permits recovery "to inure only to the ERISA plan, not
to individual beneficiaries").
109. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507-08 (7th Cir. 2005)
(denying class certification because the plaintiffs' claims involved different
circumstances surrounding termination); Spann v. AOL Time Warner, 219
F.R.D. 307, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying class certification where employer
had issued different types of releases to employees and where potential
plaintiffs were at different stages of administrative review).
110. See Ann Nevers, ERISA Right to Sue: An RX for Health Care that
Places Forum over Substantive Consumer Rights, 31 N.M. L. REV. 493, 501
n.78 (2001) ("ERISA does not require a minimum amount of benefits, but does
regulate the administration of the benefits.").
111. See Albert Feuer, When are Releases of Claims for ERISA Plan Benefits
Effective?, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 773, 777 (2005) ("ERISA does not require
employers to establish any ERISA plans, but it does impose minimum
standards on the establishment and operation of any covered employee benefit
plans that employers choose to adopt.").
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vesting schedules and other substantive protections.'12 Moreover,
certain provisions of the statute seek to enforce an employer's
promise of retirement income.1 3
As with the procedural
dimensions of ERISA, the substantive aspects of the statute suffer
from fundamental defects.
1.

Flawed FundingProvisions

ERISA purportedly ensures that employers adequately fund
their pensions. 4 The airline industry provides the most recent
illustration of the abject failure of the statute to achieve its
substantive goals. The existence of the PBGC does not offer much
comfort because that agency, itself, is underfunded by nearly $30
billion."'
The current crisis is tragically predictable because the legal
regime does not, in fact, require timely and adequate funding of
pension plans. Even as amended in 1994, ERISA only raises
PBGC premiums by a few percentage points for employers that do
not timely or fully fund their pensions." 6 In addition, ERISA does
not substantively regulate accounting and actuarial assumptions
used by pension plans." ' Among other deceitful practices, ERISA
allows employers to use problematic interest rates to "discount"
their pension obligations, sharply understating, if not concealing
outright large-scale underfunding."' At any rate, ERISA's legal

112. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a-d).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (a-d). The standards are intended to ensure that plans
maintain sufficient assets to pay eligible workers as they retire. Most plans
may begin with a deficit, which is to say that the plans beginning when the
employer has a full complement of employees may not contain sufficient assets
to meet potential liabilities from employees with past service credits. ERISA
accounts for this by allowing employers to amortize funding liabilities for past
service credits over periods of time determined by actuarial assumptions.
These periods may be extended at the discretion of the Department of Labor.
29 U.S.C. § 1084 (a).
115. Albert B. Crenshaw, Big Pension Plans Fall Further Behind, WASH.
POST, Jun. 7, 2005, at A3.
116. The Retirement Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465 (1994).
117. Geller, supra note 21 (discussing proposed FASB rules changes that
would require companies to more accurately characterize pension liabilities
and to "more accurately measure and report their retirement benefits");
Howard Silverblatt, America's Other Pension Problem; Shortfalls in funding
post-retirement health plans could hit Corporate America-and investorshard when new accounting rules go into effect, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Dec.
20, 2005 (discussing the negative outgrowths of ERISA's defective regulatory
regime).
118. See, e.g., Steven A. Kandarian, Better pension plan: tougher rules to
keep underfunding at bay, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BuSINESS, Oct. 18, 2004
(discussing the radical change in the health of United Airline's pension

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:563

framework permits the Department of Labor to waive funding
requirements if an employer can show "substantial business
hardship."'19
2.

Flawed Incentive Structure

The availability of the PBGC and the concomitant assumption
120
of liability transfers have created a moral hazard under ERISA.
As discussed above, the governing legal regime allows corporations
to delay payments to their pension plans and even permits
outright waivers." ' Increasingly, companies are also using the
threat of bankruptcy, and the status of the PBGC's
lien, to extort
1 22
beneficiaries.
pension
from
concessions
economic
Moral hazard also rears its ugly head in the context of the
stock valuation of companies
that provide pensions."

following a decrease in interest rates); Benno Groeneveld, Interest rates
blamed for General Mills'pensionplans underfunding, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL
BUSINESS
JOURNAL,
Aug.
3,
2003,
available
at
http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2003/08/04/daily25.html
(describing how General Mills' pension fund, billed as overfunded, was
determined to be underfunded when the federal interest rate was lowered).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1083. Indeed, underfunding occurred when investments
were growing steadily throughout the mid to late nineties, as well. See
generally Jonathan Elsberg, Underfunded Pensions and Perverse Incentives,
CENTER FOR POPULAR ECONOMICS, Aug. 17, 2005.
120. Keating, supra note 16, at 67-68 (defining the moral hazard problem as
when "those insured against certain risks have an incentive to use less than
optimal care to avoid those risks"). Significantly, employers are "direct
beneficiaries" of the existence of PBGC insurance because offering insured
pension benefits means that they are able to pay their employees less in terms
of present compensation. Id. at 72.
121. Robin Blackburn, The Enron Debacle and the Pension Crisis, 14 NEW
LEFT REVIEW 26, 41 (2002); Keating, supra note 16, at 73-74 (stating that in
addition to waivers, the "flexibility of actuarial assumptions" allows companies
to avoid providing sufficient funding). On November 16, 2005, the U.S. Senate
approved legislation that would push ERISA's leniency to even more absurd
levels, giving the airlines a lengthy grace period and a seven-year window in
which to address underfunding. Marilyn Geewax, Senate OKs special help for
airlines,ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, Nov. 17, 2005, at 1A.
122. See Christine Matott, Airlines in Distress: Can the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation Weather This Crisis?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 169, 204-05
(2005) (discussing employers' efforts to leverage employees in bargaining by
threatening to declare bankruptcy and to terminate pensions); Lou Whiteman,
Delta, US Air Face Key Stretch, THE DEAL, Aug. 23, 2004 (noting that airline
officials ominously told employees that bankruptcy protection may be "a useful
tool").
123. See, e.g., Norman H. Godwin and Kimberly Galligan Key, Market
Reaction to Firm Inclusion on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Underfunding List, WORKING PAPER SERIES 4-5, Mar. 1998, available at
http'//ssrn.com/abstract=115500; Jerry Geisel, PBGC to Drop Annual List of
Worst-Funded Plans,BUSINESS INSURANCE 2, Sept. 8, 1997.
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Remarkably, employers listed on the PBGC's most-underfunded24
pension list actually experienced increased rates of return.
Although the PBGC stopped publishing this list in 1997, many
corporations evidently still believe that they can attract
investment by moving toward the discharge of their pension
liabilities.'25 In sum, ERISA's statutory scheme has fostered
perverse incentives such that companies are now sacrificing
pension integrity at the altar of corporate profits.
IV. DkJA Vu ALL

OVER AGAIN: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST GONE WILD

The deficiencies of ERISA analyzed above in Part II provide
an eerie echo of the rumblings about problems with corporate
accounting practices prior to the stock-devaluation crisis of the
early Twenty-First Century. That the devastating devaluation
flowed from the lack of transparency and accountability regarding
corporate accounting should give reason for pause to reflect on
where the pension system in the United States seems to be
headed.
A.

The Parallelsbetween the Legal Regime Governing Pension
Practicesand that Covering Accounting Conduct

Like the legal framework applicable to corporate governance
before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the legal landscape for
pensions provides inadequate transparency and accountability
mechanisms. These shortcomings of the ERISA statutory scheme,
much like the securities regime in the 1990s, manifest themselves
both in the internal operations of companies as well as in the
external oversight of those operations.
1. Through a Glass Darkly: The Lack of Transparencyin
CorporateFinancialPractices
The legal regime applicable to corporate financial reporting in
the United States has conferred significant discretion to
companies in how they account for revenues and expenses.'26 The
lack of rigorous regulation opened the way, beginning in the 1980s
and accelerating in the 1990s, for corporations to "manage"

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds
and Stock Market Volatility - What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 914-29, 935-47
(2005) (analyzing the relationship between corporate financial practices and
governmental regulation over the last century); Barlett, supra note 1, at 44
(comparing accounting practices in the 1990s to pension practices in the

2000s).
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earnings via an array of practices that materially obscured market
performance and actual company value.'27 Premature revenue
recognition quickly became one of the most common and
deleteriously deceptive of such practices.'28
This premature-revenue-recognition tactic represents a
cynical perversion of the well settled practice of moderating
earnings fluctuations through minor tweaking of financial
statements; in particular, corporate managers were now advancing
the moment of revenue recognition and, frequently, concealing
from shareholders poor market standing and other negative
data. 9
Notably, the very executives with the ability to
manipulate the timing of revenue recognition also stood to benefit
markedly from inflated earnings statements because stock options
had become such a significant portion of executive compensation
packages."'
Not surprisingly, "accounting scandals rose
commensurate with this shift toward premature recognition." 1
As if the opportunistic and self-dealing behavior of key
executives was not bad enough, the accounting firms auditing
these financially compromised companies had evidently tolerated
and even participated in the obfuscation. The Big Five firms, so
called before the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., all appear
to have been involved 32in accounting irregularities to one degree or
another in the 1990s.1

127. Id. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 276-77 (2004)
(discussing corporate accounting and governance practices that have been
prevalent in the last quarter century).
128. The General Accounting Office found that nearly forty percent of
financial restatements from 1997 to 2002 resulted from revenue recognition
errors. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. 03-138, Financial Statement
Restatements. See Coffee, supra note 127, at 276-77 (discussing corporate
accounting and governance practices that have been prevalent in the last
quarter century).
129. Indeed, more than half of the litigation over corporate accounting
practices evidently concerned premature revenue recognition. Holman W.
Jenkins, Jr., Accounting For When Dreams Become Reality, WALL STREET J.,
June 13, 2001, at A21. In view of the revenue recognition abuses, even the
fairly corporate-friendly Securities and Exchange Commission issued
regulations in this regard - ultimately to little avail as the subsequent
accounting and corporate-governance scandals tragically confirmed. 64 FED.
REG. 68, 936 (Dec. 9, 1999).
130. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control
of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1233, 1244-47 (2002); Daniel V. Dooley, Financial Fraud: Accounting
Theory and Practice,8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 53, 58-66 (2002).
131. Coffee, supra note 127, at 276.
132. See Jonathan Weil, SEC Sanctions 2 at Ernst & Young: PartnersAided
Violations at Cendant, Agency Says; A Suspension from Audits, WALL STREET
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Auditors, much like corporate managers, have had a financial
incentive to play hide-the-ball with company revenues and
expenses. As the 1990s progressed, auditing firms' revenues from
consulting services began to dwarf monies received for conducting
audits.'33
By satisfying a corporate client's auditing needs,
whether those needs were legitimate or not, accounting firms
typically also captured enormous sums from subsequent
consulting services for the "audited" clients. 3" In other words,
accounting firms were increasingly using audits as a marketing
tool to attract the more lucrative consulting business.
The scholarship and related data on corporate misdeeds
regarding pension practices remains much less well developed, to
date, for obvious reasons.
We have yet to witness pension
scandals on the order that precipitated the collapse of high-profile
corporations, including Enron, and well established accounting
firms, such as Andersen.
Nonetheless, emerging dynamics in the pension environment
reflect a pernicious lack of transparency that parallels that which
has plagued corporate accounting practices.'
Although ERISA
purports to mandate clarity of pension rights and plan obligations,
the reality is often unfortunately different.'3 6

J., Apr. 25, 2003, at C7 (outlining misconduct by accounting firms); Sloan,
Periscope:How Arthur Andersen Begs for Business, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 2002,
at 6 (outlining statistical analysis of accounting practices by the major firms).
See also Coffee, supra note 127, at 281-82 (reviewing the performance of the
Big Five accounting firms).
133. Coffee, supra note 127, at 291 ("[Alccording to one recent survey, the
typical large public corporation now pays its auditor for consulting services
three times what it pays for auditing services.").
134. In fact, accounting firms reportedly used their auditing services to reel
in the much more lucrative consulting business. Lee Berton, Audit Fees Fall
as CPA Firms Jockey for Bids, WALL STREET J., Jan. 28, 1985, at A33. See
also Coffee, supra note 127, at 291-92 (rebutting the argument that the
proliferation of consulting services does not create improper conflicts-ofinterest which materially affect financial reporting).
135. Cummins, supra note 2, at A22 (outlining the practice of manipulating
plan terms to "wear away" pension obligations without officially changing
pension benefits); see also Geller, supra note 19 (reporting that ERISA does
not require companies to disclose shortfalls in light of actual earnings returns
and using General Motors to illustrate-its stated book value in 2004 was
approximately $30 billion while its actual book value appeared to be nearly
$20 billion in the negative); Brush supra note 21 (describing the deceitful
practice of using pensions' anticipated assets to balance company books);
supra Part II.A (discussing the gathering threat to pensions in the U.S.).
136. For an explanation of these circumstances, see supra Part III.
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2. "Hear"No Evil! "See" No Evil: The Lack of Accountability
Regarding CorporateMisconduct
The relationship between the lack of transparency and the
lack of accountability recalls the proverbial chicken-and-egg
conundrum.
On the one hand, the lack of transparency in
accounting certainly has thwarted efforts to hold parties
accountable for financial transgressions.'37 On the other hand, the
relatively toothless enforcement mechanisms existing before the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley have fostered a corporate-accounting
environment characterized more by manipulation and evasion
than clarity.138
As set forth at greater length below, the
destructively symbiotic relationship between the dearth of
transparency and accountability flowed from a flawed legal
framework that Congress sought to remedy through legislative
reforms embodied in Sarbanes-Oxley.
Particularly in the 1990s, the legal exposure for accounting
malfeasance decreased dramatically.
Both Congressional
enactments and Supreme Court rulings insulated auditors from
liability for accounting irregularities. 9
This altered legal
framework sharply curtailed private litigation concerning
securities fraud.14 0
At the same time, and perhaps not
coincidentally, the threat of enforcement actions by governmental

137. As the tactic of premature revenue recognition exemplifies, regulators
and aggrieved parties have often faced a moving target when exploring
whether to challenge certain accounting practices. See, e.g., Karmel, supra
note 126, at 914-19, 934-47 (illustrating the challenges in regulating financial
practices); Jennifer O'Hare, Misleading Employer Communications and the
Securities Fraud Implications of the Employee as Investor, 48 VILL. L. REV.
1217, 1230-33 (2003) (demonstrating the inability of federal law and
regulators in preventing fraudulent practices). Under such circumstances,
identifying - let alone proving - a legal violation can be a challenge. Id.
138. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing ERISA's promotion of equity).
139. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67
§ 101, 109 Stat. at 737-49 (elevating the pleadings standards for class actions
in the securities context and narrowed the liability of auditors in several
respects); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 186-88 (1994) (rescinding aiding-and-abetting liability in securitiesfraud cases); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 359-61 (1991) (narrowing the statute of limitations for securities-fraud
claims).
140. Not only did private actions drop, but cases against accountants and
counsel also virtually evaporated. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE
FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF

1995 4, 21-22 (1997) (illustrating the drop in private actions as well as actions
against accountants and counsel). For additional analysis of this point, see
Coffee, supra note 127, at 289-90.

20061

ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World

agencies also diminished significantly."" Consequently, the major
accounting firms had less motivation to root out improper business
practices of their client companies - especially when the firms
stood to lose tremendous sums in consulting business with these
same companies should they give their clients negative feedback.'42
As it did for auditors, the securities legal framework afforded
corporate executives perniciously wide latitude in the 1980s and
especially in the 1990s.113 Prior to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley,
the regulated essentially became the regulator. The boards of
directors monitoring major companies and, by implication, their
top executives, relied heavily on data generated and presented by
those same executives being evaluated.'" Given the increasing
"management" of earnings by corporate executives and the
acquiescence by outside auditing firms to potentially fraudulent
practices, a clear moral hazard surfaced. In sum, corporate
managers have had undue control over the availability of the
information on which any enforcement action against their
companies would turn.14
The conflicts of interest in the pension setting may be even
worse than with respect to the securities arena. ERISA requires
corporations to designate an administrator of pension plans and
creates fiduciary responsibilities for the administrator.'46
In
theory, such a structure should ensure equity and security of
pension plans.
In practice, however, the pension-plan
administrator may actually be the company employing the plan
beneficiaries and/or one of the company's high-ranking
executives. 47 As described in more detail above in Parts I-II, this

141. According to SEC officials, that agency shifted its focus away from
challenging the auditing practices of the major accounting firms.

Coffee,

supra note 127, at 290.
142. For an explication of this dynamic with respect to Andersen in
particular, see Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 917, 921-24 (2003).

143. Many analysts attribute the corporate governance scandals of the 1990s
to the lack of meaningful oversight over company executives. Karmel, supra
note 126, at 914-19, 934-47; O'Hare, supra note 135, at 1230-33.
144. Given board members' material dependence on executives for financial
data and in light of the corporate accounting scandals of the 1990s, the SEC
has required boards to maintain a majority of plainly independent members.
Karmel, supra note 126, at 930.
145. Coffee, supra note 127, at 297-98; O'Hare, supra note 137, at 1224-33.
146. ERISA, at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), codifies several duties originally
recognized at common law. Howe, 516 U.S. at 496 (1996). These legal
obligations include the duties of care, loyalty, and prudence. Id.
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (expressly allowing employers to administer
pension plans); Adams v. LTV Steel Min. Co., 936 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992) (reaffirming that a corporation can be
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structure has created the sometimes realized opportunity for the
plan fiduciary to act more in the interest of the corporation than
the beneficiaries. 48
Moreover, unlike company boards of directors, ordinary
employees with a stake in a pension plan do not necessarily have
the technical knowledge to fully understand the legal
requirements and the consequences of various corporate actions.149
Exacerbating matters further, ERISA's scheme gives the
impression of rigorous monitoring and enforcement - creating a
false sense of security among many beneficiaries, especially those
who are less sophisticated in financial matters. 5 '
Therefore, ERISA paradoxically creates the impression of
greater protection while actually affording less.
Indeed, the
statutory scheme - by its express terms and how it has been
subsequently interpreted by federal courts - invites the
opportunistic behavior that eventually took down the likes of
Enron and Andersen. 151

both the employer and plan fiduciary for purposes of ERISA). Exacerbating
matters, the Supreme Court accorded employers great deference in the
discharge of their fiduciary duties. See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch., 489 U.S. 101 (1989); see also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court
Flunks Trusts, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 220 (1990) (illustrating the great
deference the Court accords employers).
148. Self-interested fiduciaries have posed an ongoing threat to the integrity
of pension plans. See Muir, supra note 14, at 415-22 (discussing the problem
of self-interested fiduciaries).
149. For an incisive critique of ERISA's assumption that pension
beneficiaries are knowledgeable and informed decision-makers, see generally
Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans
Today: ConformingERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 63-73 (2000); see
also O'Hare, supra note 137, at 1224-28 (underscoring the vulnerability of
ordinary employees to manipulation by corporate executives regarding
financial matters). In fact, Department of Labor policy has encouraged
employers not to provide beneficiaries with needed information to exercise
sound judgment. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(2), 2550.404c-1(c)(4).
150. In truth, Congress and the PBGC have given corporations wide latitude
to adjust formulas for calculating pension assets and obligations in a way that
can transform "a drastically underfunded system into a financially healthy
one, even inflate a company's profits and push up its stock price." Barlett,
supra note 1, at 44. Moreover, Congress and the PBGC largely looked the
other way as corporate raiders and Wall Street buy-out firms extracted
approximately $21 billion - during the 1980s alone - that had been earmarked
for pensions. Id. at 42. In this context, it is especially troubling that pension
plans are now pouring billions into hedge funds, which historically have been
secretive and lightly regulated investment vehicles for the very rich. Riva D.
Atlas & Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Officers Putting Billions Into Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at Al.
151. See supra Part III.B-C.; see also Adam Geller, Accounting Change May
Squeeze Some Pensions, S. F. ExAM'R, Jan. 18, 2006, available at
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As with accounting practices before adoption of SarbanesOxley, the current approach to pensions is plagued by internally
and externally driven impediments to transparency and
accountability. These shortcomings combine to make more likely,
if not induce outright, the proliferation of deleterious conflicts of
interest, as discussed in more detail above in Parts I and II.
B. The Recent Accounting Scandals as a Preview
of the Perilous Futurefor the Pension System
If the corporate-governance crisis of the early Twenty-First
Century is any indication, the dearth of transparency and
accountability discussed above will accelerate the erosion of the
systemic equity and pension security ERISA supposedly promotes.
Otherwise stated, the fundamental shortcomings of the ERISA
statutory scheme make it unlikely that the pension system can be
saved from eventual ruin without the implementation of radical
reforms.
Importantly, the links between the accounting scandals and
the emerging pension crisis exist at multiple levels.
As a
threshold matter, the literal and figurative fortunes of many
pensions have been wrapped up in the very corporations
implicated in the recent securities-fraud scandals. Companies
that took substantial economic hits because of accounting
malfeasance have been part of the portfolios of several large
pensions.'
Accordingly, when the stock of fraudulently governed
corporations has gone south, so has the integrity of those pension
plans."
In addition, the path that has led to the demise of
corporations, such as Enron, and accounting firms, like Andersen,

http://www.sfexaminer.conV
articles/2006/01/19/business/20060119_buO3_acct.txt (confirming that many
companies "engage in a shell game and mislead investors about the value of
stocks, bonds and other assets held by pension plans").
152. See Justin R. Kaufman, Halting the Enron Train Wreck: Using the
Bankruptcy Code to Rescue Retirement Plans, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 595, 596 (2003)
(noting that many large American companies have established retirement
savings plans funded in part by company stock); Blackburn, supra note 121, at
40 (discussing the culture of pension fund investment that contributed to the
Enron debacle and the series of cases that followed which highlighted the
contribution of lax auditing to failures at Sunbeam, Waste Management, and
Global Crossing); Ethan G. Zelizer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Accounting for
Corporate Corruption?, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 27, 30 (2002) (discussing

the accounting misstatements and the concomitant losses of WorldCom,
Global Crossing, and Rite Aid).
153. See Blackburn, supra note 121, at 46-47 (recounting that when big
companies such as Global Crossing, K-Mart, and LTV go bankrupt, their
employees' retirement plans are hurt as well).
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seems to be the same path now traveled by key pension plans.
Just as the lack of transparency and accountability in the
accounting context encouraged the malfeasance that prompted
economic setbacks and even bankruptcy, so too has the obfuscation
and evasion afflicting pension practices undermined pension
security and even caused outright default.'
Viewing pensions
administered by Delphi, Delta, and Bethlehem as a harbinger for
the future, the reasonable expectations and concrete needs of
millions of employees will be thwarted - unless decisive and
meaningful ERISA reform occurs soon."'
Indeed, what may be more worrisome about pension practices,
as opposed to securities conduct, is that pensions are ostensibly
monitored by PBGC.
Especially in the existing political
environment, the PBGC has given the imprimatur of
governmental approval of questionable pension practices.56
In its present state, the PBGC may also be counterproductive
in that it creates the false impression that, even if ERISA
violations occur, beneficiaries holdings are fully insured in
instances of default.'5 7 This could not be further from the truth,

154. See O'Hare, supra note 137, at 1222-29 (discussing the significance of
employer communications on employee investment decision and the danger
associated with misleading information which can lead ultimately to
disproportionate suffering on the part of employees); Kaufman, supra note
152, at 596-97, 604-05 (highlighting the prevalence of company stock in
employee pension plans and the devastating impact employer bankruptcy can
have on such pension plans); Blackburn, supra note 121, at 36-44 (noting the
lack of control employees as shareholders through pension plans have over the
management of pension funds and the conflict of interest possessed by those in
control of the funds); Zelizer, supra note 152, at 36-43.
155. See generally Brush, supra note 21 (reporting the looming pension fund
crisis is ultimately the consequence of underfunded pension plans and the
pension guaranty system near bankruptcy); Condon, supra note 21
(documenting the vulnerability of companies that have yet to recover from the
stock market fall of 2000 and those companies who owe workers more in
pension payments than the whole company would be worth in liquidation).
See also Barlett, supra note 1, at 44 (noting the recent acceleration in the
undermining of policies); Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 72 (discussing the
pension fund problems of Bethlehem Steel leading up to its bankruptcy filing
and the role Delphi C.E.O., Robert Miller, played in guiding Bethlehem
through bankruptcy).
156. For instance, the PBGC has ceased compiling and publishing the
annual list of the 50 most underfunded pension plans. Barlett, supra note 1,
at 38.
157. As the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s and the subsequent
accounting problems demonstrate, the illusion of government protection is
perhaps more harmful than no protection at all. Coffee, supra note 127, at 278
("Because the government guaranteed banks' financial obligations to
depositors, these depositors had little reason to monitor management, and
accordingly bank promoters were able to leverage their firms excessively. In
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most obviously because ERISA caps the amount insured for
pension beneficiaries.'
In addition, as exemplified by
beneficiaries of Northwest's pension plan, many retirees will likely
receive markedly less via a PBGC bailout than they should under
the plan's terms.'
Notably, this fleecing of beneficiaries has
occurred at a time when the demand on the PBGC's resources has
not been as large as it will soon be."
The inequity of the situation becomes even more evident with
the recognition that, while corporations deny ordinary employees
retirement benefits for a lifetime of actual work, companies pay
executives retirement dollars for years they never worked.'
Moreover, many companies that deny pension benefits to their
regular workers simultaneously provide special pension plans that
guarantee those managers set benefits.'
V. LEGAL REFORM NEEDED
At the risk of stating the obvious, ERISA's goals of equity and
security are under attack in the current political climate. The
brusque, unforgiving rhetoric of "individualism" and "personal
responsibility" - often euphemisms for social Darwinism - has
become a virtual mantra for the Bush administration. As the
unfolding discourse about the pension system exemplifies, the
shrill proclamations about the superiority of an "ownership
society" have obscured the reality and value of interdependency
and mutual support."
Indeed, allies of the existing political
regime have dubbed pensions a "relic of the past."" Accordingly,

the case of the Enron-era scandals, the impact of executive stock compensation
may have played a similar explanatory role").
158. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 63738 (1990) (recognizing the limitations ERISA places on the PBGC's insurance
coverage).
159. Cummins, supra note 2, at A22 (noting that PBGC does not cover everincreasing health benefits and will not necessarily cover interim pension
raises).
160. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 58. See also Cummins, supra note 2, at
A22-23.
161. Barlett, supra note 1, at 40. In addition, high-profile companies with
ties to the Bush Administration have improperly diverted money from the
workers' pension fund to executive and bonus plans. Mary Williams Walsh,
U.S. Inquiry Found Halliburton Mishandled Some Pension Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at C3.
162. Weller & Singleton, supra note 6, at 1.
163. See Paul Glastris, Bush's Ownership Society: Why No One's Buying,
WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2005, at 14 (noting that the movement to shift
responsibility for benefits to individuals often draws on tropes of personal
responsibility and individual choice).
164. Alex Pagon, The Next Bailout? How Underfunded Pensions Put
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it should not be surprising that the proposals to amend ERISA fall
far short of the mark. Not only would the pending legislation fail
to salvage the integrity of the pension system, it could actually
aggravate the crisis in some instances.
A.

The Structuraland PracticalLimitations of Pending
Legislation

As set forth more fully above in Part I, the worsening pension
situation has received considerable attention by commentators and
politicians alike. Nonetheless, the proposed reforms before the
65
109'b Congress do little to correct ERISA's structural defects.
The ensuing discussion analyzes the most significant initiatives
currently being debated in Congress.
1.

Intensificationof ERISA's PerverseIncentive Structure

The Employee Pension Preservation Act of 2005'6 may lead
the pack as the most Orwellian because it actually permits airline
industry pensions to restructure their underfunded liabilities over
a twenty-five year period. This "reform" would, if enacted, add
substantially to the uncertainty surrounding the viability of
pension plans for individual employees. In short, the incentive to
underfund would continue largely unimpeded for the foreseeable
future.

Taxpayers at Risk, NAT'L TAXPAYERS UNION FOUND. POLICY PAPER (Aug. 18,

2003),
available at
http://www.ntu.org/main/press.php?PressID=166&
org-name=NTUF.
165. See Pension Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2830, 109th Cong. (2005)
(locking plans into vesting and accrual schedules that bar lump-sum
distributions to divest liabilities, setting a fifteen-year amortization schedule
(subject to exceptions), creating requirements for multiemployer plans that are
in financial trouble, and establishing standard interest-rate and mortality
assumptions for lump-sum plans); Employee's Pension Security Act of 2005,
H.R. 4055, 109th Cong. (2005), (restructuring plans to require the assets to be
held in trust by a joint board, requiring clear information-dissemination that
includes investment data, and placing limits on distress terminations, and
giving participants the right to intervene and challenge bankruptcy plans);
Employee Benefits Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1058, 109th Cong. (2005)
(extending pension benefits to independent contractors and contingent
workers); Preservation of Defined Benefit Plans Act of 2005, H.R. 4274, 109th
Cong. (2005)(creating supplemental notice provisions and clarifying the
application of age-discrimination principles to benefit reductions); Pension
Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2005, H.R. 1961, 109th Cong.
(2005) (creating additional notice requirements concerning defined-benefitplan beneficiaries); Employee Pension Preservation and Taxpayer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. 2106, 109th Cong. (2005) (setting forth transition rules for
plans that are about to terminate).
166. S. 861, 109th Cong. (2005).

20061

ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World

Another troubling initiative, the Pension Protection Act of
2005, has already been approved by the House167 and the Senate."
The House version includes a provision that would create, under
Section 502 of ERISA, a new cause of action for pension plans to,
in effect, sue plan beneficiaries for damages. In other words,
ERISA would allow plans to recover from pension beneficiaries if
those beneficiaries successfully litigated their ERISA claims,
further reducing the incentive for beneficiaries to enforce pension
rights. The companion bill in the Senate does not currently
contain this language, but the product of the House/Senate
Conference Committee
may very well incorporate
this
counterproductive element.
2.

Perfunctory Treatment of ERISA's FundamentalDefects

Several other bills would merely make minor changes in the
name of achieving meaningful reform.
Some potential
amendments
to ERISA include additional requirements
concerning the disclosure of information about the status of
participants' benefits and fund investments." 9 These initiatives
offer some promise, but they do not address the fundamental flaws
of ERISA regarding malfeasance in pension administration. Other
legislation would increase PBGC premiums and create risk-based
premium increases.17 °
These are similarly useful but not
sufficient, in and of themselves, to effect substantial reform
because they fail to adequately reward plaintiffs who seek to
reform plan administration.
Another proposal, entitled the
Pension Fairness and Full Disclosure Act of 2005, would limit the
availability of benefits under an employer's nonqualified deferredcompensation plans if traditional pension plans undergo a distress
termination.'7 1 Although this might decrease the incentive to
short-change traditional pensions in favor of executives' top-hat
plans, the pending legislation would do little to stave off pensionplan distress.
The bill that would create an "advocate" position and a
clearinghouse of pension data for beneficiaries could be the most
helpful initiative currently under consideration.'72 At a minimum,
the proposal highlights the current opacity of ERISA regulations
and pension plans; however, it also would add layers of
bureaucracy to an already Byzantine system. The newly created

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

H.R 2830 (2005).
S. 1783 (2005).
H.R. 4055 (2005); H.R. REP. NO. 2830 (2005).
H.R. 2830 (2005); S. NO. 1783 (2005).
S. 991 (2005).
S.608 (2005).
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"advocate" position would exist within the Department of Labor,
and it would be vulnerable to the political pulls of that agency.'"
In addition, creating a mammoth depository of ERISA plan
information could paradoxically obscure the critical information
most needed by plan beneficiaries. In other words, a library of
sorts with respect to ERISA information may be as unhelpful in
explicating pension rights as many SPDs have been.
B. The Requisite Components of True Reform
To avoid a complete pension fiasco, ERISA's legal framework
must fully vindicate the original purposes of that statute: to
improve transparency and accountability with respect to plan
administration and, consequently, to increase retirement security
as well as equity among workers.174
Procedural reform must therefore address the lack of useful
information available to participants.
In particular, any
amendments must enable plaintiffs to formulate reasonable
expectations about their livelihoods in retirement based on clear
and reliable pension information.'
In addition, decisive action
must be taken to ensure there is meaningful review of pension
practices." 6 In this regard, private enforcement actions must be
accorded the efficacy and importance they deserve.'77
ERISA reforms must also remedy the substantive
shortcomings of the statute. The loopholes that permit systematic
underfunding must be closed.'78 Moreover, insurance under the
PBGC should not be used to leverage unfair economic concessions
in the context of threatened bankruptcy and otherwise. 9
C. No Time Like The Present:Proposed Statutory Amendments
To Achieve Actual Equity and Pension Security
ERISA, as currently administered and interpreted, affords
little protection to plan beneficiaries.
While the legislation
pending before Congress offer certain piecemeal changes, the

173. Id.
174. For further discussion of the propriety of this approach, see supra Part

II.A.
175. For further discussion of the propriety of this approach, see Cummings,

supra note 62, at 880-81; see also supra,Part III.B.1.
176. For further discussion of the propriety of this approach, see supra Part

III.B.2.
177. See supra,Part III.B.3. (discussing the propriety of this approach).
178. See supra,Part II.B. (discussing the propriety of this approach).
179. See supra,Part II.B. (discussing the propriety of this approach).
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proposals below constitute a more comprehensive approach to
reorienting ERISA to its original intent.8 s
1. Provisionof Tools Better EnablingPensionBeneficiariesto be
Active Stewards of Their Plans
A number of pension administrators evidently have assumed,
much like some corporate executives and accountants in the 1990s,
that employees and shareholders can be kept in the dark about
improper financial practices - at least until the damage has been
done. The following reforms should enhance transparency and,
therefore, accountability concerning the pension system. Greater
transparency and accountability will also spawn improved equity
and security.'
a.

Complete and Accurate Disclosures

Plan beneficiaries must receive clear, truthful, and current
information about the status of their pensions. ERISA must be
amended to make explicit that corporations shall affirmatively and
regularly produce information about pension status in simple82
terms - that is, the "plain language" is, in fact, plain language.
Thus, employers must provide semi-annual notices that concisely
report pension assets and liabilities as well as the risk levels of
pension investments. ERISA should also require companies to
disclose in writing immediately and succinctly any proposed and
actual changes to plan provisions. 83
b.

Complete and Accurate Funding Calculations

This category of reforms relates to the first because many
companies currently use a number of actuarial estimates and
discounting methods that misleadingly alter the outlook for their
pension funds." This creates shifting sands on which pension
M

180. Even the Bush Administration, which has close ties to big business, has
recognized that the status quo must be addressed. Deb Reichman, Bush Urges
Congress to Pass Stricter Rules on Pensions, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE,
Dec. 6, 2005, at D3.
181. See supra, Part III. (analyzing the symbiotic relationship between
transparency and accountability - and lack thereof - as well as the connection
to pension equity and security).
182. See supra, Part III.B.1. (discussing how ERISA's existing disclosure
provisions often do more to obscure than to inform).
183. The current legal regime plainly does not provide for this. See, e.g.,

Holloway, supra note 70 at 185. "ERISA looks as though it justifies prompt
notice, but ERISA analysis and information is in the gray areas of prompt
notice; therefore, any decision eventually raising a prompt notice issue may be
ripe with managerial uncertainty for plan administrators and managers." Id.
184. Albert B. Crenshaw, Rule Would Put Pension Deficits on the Books,
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beneficiaries have built their expectations for retirement.
Corporations must be required to adopt standardized actuarial
calculations and accounting procedures, including the use of a
discount rate that is anchored by an independent and verifiable
methodology - and to adhere to those standards.'85 This will
ensure that pension liabilities can be viewed in more absolute
terms and that underfunding liabilities will not disappear by
accounting fiat.
c.

Independent Auditing

In response to the accounting scandals of the 1990s, Congress
required the creation of independent auditing committees by
companies pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley."6
A similar approach
should be incorporated into ERISA's scheme.
Importantly,
pension auditing committees should consist of trustees, plan
administrators, and plan beneficiaries in equal numbers. 8 ' These
committees would review and evaluate pension investments,
assets and liabilities as well as administrative expenditures and
other items that have a material impact on financial standing.
The diversity of membership, especially the inclusion of wellinformed plan beneficiaries, should provide a powerful check on
any potential corporate malfeasance.
2. Meaningful Consequences for Pension Underfundingand
Mismanagement
Given the interrelationship between accountability and
pension equity, as well as security, the following reforms would
enhance the value of ERISA for ordinary beneficiaries. In short,

WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 11, 2005, at D3 (discussing possible rule changes

that would affect pension accounting practices); see also Lowenstein, supra
note 3, at 56 (noting that employer's can hide actual future liabilities by
applying a speculative discount rate).
185. See, e.g., PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, 2004 ACTUARiAL

REPORT,

15-17,

available at

http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2004_actuarial_

report.pdf (setting forth detailed actuarial assumptions that should underlie
benefit projections).
186. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10a-2
(implementing Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements).
187. For analysis with respect to the importance of transforming board
membership, see generally Clara Jeffery, Sink or Swim, MOTHER JONES,
Sept./Oct., 2005 ("According to the SEC, more than half of consulting firms
that advise pension plans also work with money managers - conflicts of

interest that cost pension funds between 10% and 15% of their assets.");
Gretchen Morgenson, Merrill Unit Subpoenaed On Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2005, at C2 (describing the SEC investigation into possible conflicts of
interest for pension advisers).
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these provisions should minimize the likelihood that employers
will not be able to balance their books on the backs of
beneficiaries.
a.

Expanded Causes of Action

Following the lead of Sarbanes-Oxley, ERISA should feature a
robust whistleblower provision.'
Currently, ERISA fails to
protect employees from retaliation for good faith reports of
suspected ERISA violations and for internal complaints about
apparent violations.'
Nor can plaintiffs maintain whistleblower
actions under more frequently favorable state laws because of the
breadth of ERISA preemption.'
As Congress recognized in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley,
employees are often the best situated to learn about and report
evident illegalities by companies.
To encourage vigorous
monitoring and reporting activity by employees, ERISA must be
amended to create a cause of action for employees who experience
retaliation for doing the following: making internal or external
reports, whether formal or informal," when those reports - even if
ultimately proven incorrect - were based upon a good faith belief
that a suspected violation of law, rule, or professional or ethical
standard occurred .92

188. Although ERISA does provide a claim for retaliation, it is circumscribed
and, in any event, the remedies for retaliation are limited. 29 U.S.C. § 1140;
McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1999).
189. King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003)
(determining that whistleblower actions under § 1140 do not apply to internal
complaints); but see Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding internal complaints may be sufficient to satisfy Section 1140).
190. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 408 (ruling that an employee's state-law claim
for retaliation was preempted because it would require interpretation of
ERISA plans about which she had complained); McLean v. Carlson Co., Inc.,
777 F. Supp. 1480, 1483 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding that an employee's
whistleblower lawsuit under state law was preempted by ERISA).
191. Other employment-related statutes provide similar protection. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (providing protection from retaliation for individuals who
"opposed any practice" that violates Title VII). To ensure that ERISA rights
are fully protected, employee's reports to coworkers should be adequate to
trigger whistleblower protection so long as the employer has actual or
constructive knowledge of the reports.
192. This expansive protection will encourage the requisite reporting activity
as Congress evidently recognized when enacting Sarbanes-Oxley. Larry Cata
Backer, Enron and its Aftermath: The Sarbanes-OxleyAct: FederalizingNorms
for Officer, Lawyer, and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 897, 942
n.171 (2002) (citing 148 CONG. REC., S. 6759 (2002)) (confirming that
Sarbanes-Oxley "protects whistleblowers who reveal unethical acts by the
companies for which they work").
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Congress should also amend ERISA to give employees a
private right of action to address chronic underfunding of
pensions. 9 3 In a nutshell, pension beneficiaries would have a legal
claim for companies' failure to make timely and/or adequate
contributions to their funds. The efficacy of this amendment
necessarily turns on the elimination of the corporate loopholes
discussed more fully below in Part TV.C.2.c. The contours of
underfunding suits would track those of existing claims under
ERISA, except that they would include the enhancements outlined
in the next subsection.
b.

Enhanced Enforcement Activity

Especially since the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone,
companies have been accorded a high degree of deference in their
decision-making regarding pension management."
Potential
plaintiffs have little reason to go to the time and expense of trying
to enforce pension rights in a framework wherein the judiciary, by
law, does not rigorously scrutinize pension administration and,
further, wherein plaintiffs could be punished financially for not
prevailing in a highly complex and technical area.9
Therefore, true reform must include a number of nonmonetary items related to litigation of ERISA claims. First and
foremost, Congress should abrogate Firestone to ensure that
substantive judicial review of plan decisions occur. In addition,
the statute must eliminate the requirement that ERISA plaintiffs
1
exhaust administrative remedies prior to pursuing court actions. 9
This amendment should minimize the expense of protecting
pension benefits going forward. 97
Likewise, the statute of
limitations for filing suit should be extended to six years. Pension
beneficiaries often do not have access to key information that
would alert them to ERISA violations, so ordinary employees need
ample time to investigate potentially unlawful conduct. The
statute must also create a right to class relief to eliminate costly
class-certification litigation, especially in breach-of-fiduciary duty

193. See supra, Part I. (explaining how the widespread and seemingly
expanding practice of underfunding necessitates this cause of action).
194. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989).
195. Jessica Westbrook, Resolving the Dispute Over When Attorney's Fees
Should Be Awarded Under ERISA in Two Words: PlaintiffPrevails, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 1311, 1319 (2002) (illustrating the crucial role of attorney's fees awards).
196. Kennedy, supra, note 85 at 361 (analyzing ERISA's exhaustion
requirement).
197. 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1) does not permit parties to recover attorney's fees
incurred during the administrative phase of the dispute; rather, ERISA limits
awards to fees incurred after the start of formal judicial proceedings. Parke v.

First Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004).
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cases.
Finally, Congress should amend ERISA expressly to
authorize courts to fashion broad equitable relief, such as placing
pension plans in receivership in cases of egregious underfunding
or mismanagement.
In terms of monetary awards, ERISA must explicitly grant
the attorney's fees and costs incurred by prevailing plaintiffs and
preclude the award of attorney's fees and costs to defendants.
Moreover, the right to a jury trial as well as punitive damages and
a treble damages provision must be unequivocal under ERISA. 98
These amendments will substantially increase the legal exposure
for companies that underfund or mismanage their pensions, so
ERISA compliance should improve markedly.
c.

Closed Corporate Escape Hatches

Lately, the preferred means for companies to evade their
mounting pension obligations seems to be bankruptcy proceedings.
As discussed more fully above in Part I, several high-profile
corporations terminated, via the bankruptcy process, their pension
plans as part of their overall reorganization scheme. In so doing,
these companies have dumped their pension obligations onto the
PBGC.1 ' Corporations also have terminated their pension plans
in connection with the companies' outright liquidation, requiring
the PBGC to stand in line with all other creditors for what will
likely be a fraction of the obligation it assumed when the pension
plan terminated in distress. Given that the PBGC itself does not
have sufficient assets to cover the liabilities of underfunded
pensions at the present time, bankruptcy represents a large escape
hatch indeed."°
ERISA must bestow on the PBGC a "superpriority" status in
bankruptcy proceedings, so "no assets of a company with a
terminated pension program [would] be transferred until the
reimbursement claim of PBGC is satisfied fully.""°' This would

198. Other employment related statutes provide for the right to a jury trial,
punitive damages, and even the multiplication of damages. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201, et seq. (permitting a trial by jury and the award of double damages to
prevailing plaintiffs). As anti-trust jurisprudence demonstrates, the damages
multiplier is particularly important in encouraging the private bar to litigate
cases in a highly technical and costly area of law. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.; see
also Minn. Stat. § 363A.29, Subd. 4 (authorizing the award of treble damages
to plaintiffs in employment cases).
199. See, e.g., Edward Zelinsky, The Defined-Contribution Paradigm, 114
YALE L.J. 451, 465-66 (2004) (noting that the PBGC bears the risk of loss in a
catastrophic default by a pension plan).
200. For further discussion of the impact of bankruptcy proceedings and the
PBGC's underfunding on pensions, see, supra, Part I.
201. Keating, supra note 16, at 100.
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give creditors an incentive to police the pensions of companies with
which they conduct business because the status of those plans
would have a material impact on the creditors' recovery in
bankruptcy. 2 This amendment also should circumscribe the
moral hazard for companies intending to reorganize.
In any case, ERISA and the Bankruptcy code should be
amended to require employers to decapitalize before declaring
bankruptcy. This prerequisite would motivate employers to search
for solutions other than bankruptcy and plan termination in
difficult times.0 2 In addition, it would avert competition between
employees and creditors for promised retirement benefits.
Even before a company reaches the point of potential
bankruptcy, however, ERISA should mandate accountability. In
particular, Department-of-Labor waivers must be eliminated
completely.2" Even when underfunding has been amortized and,
presumably, corrected over time,2 5 the underfunding has harmed
pension funds by reducing the availability of interest-generating
capital. Moreover, ERISA should require PBGC premium rates to
be tied to the actual risk posed by an underfunded plan.2° In
short, this means that the size of a PBGC premium assessed
against an employer should be directly proportionate to the
likelihood of default, especially if a plan is chronically
underfunded or reliant upon accounting "adjustments" to appear
appropriately funded.
VI. CONCLUSION

Congress adopted ERISA at a time when the retreat from the
principles animating the New Deal began to accelerate.
Nonetheless, ERISA embraces core values that informed the New
Deal era - most notably a notion of mutual responsibility and
interdependent welfare. Accordingly, ERISA labors under an
internal tension that has impeded the achievement of actual
transparency
and
accountability
concerning
pension

202. Id.; Christine Matott, Airlines in Distress: Can the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation Weather This Crisis?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 169, 192
(2005) (asserting that moving the PBGC's lien to priority status in bankruptcy
could eliminate the practice of foregoing pension payments to pay other
creditors).
203. Alternatives to bankruptcy could include private restructuring of
creditor debt or seeking other sources of capital investment.
204. 29 U.S.C. § 1083.
205. 29 U.S.C. § 1084.

206. Absent this reform, the PBGC will soon be overwhelmed beyond
remediation with debt. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 58. See also Cummins,

supra note 2, at A22-23. For an excellent illustration of the limited protection
afforded by the PBGC, see generally Keating, supra note 16, at 65.
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administration.
Equity and security, two of ERISA's most
important objectives, have suffered as a result.
Opportunistic behavior by unscrupulous corporate executives
and administrators, aided and abetted by ERISA's procedural and
substantive defects, has put the integrity of the pension system in
grave jeopardy. Unfortunately, the nation has been down this
road before with respect to lending practices in the 1980s and
securities practices in the 1990s. The economic and social fallout
from those debacles should be a wake up call for the country as the
pension crisis expands.
To avert a disaster akin to, or even worse than, the savingsand-loan and corporate-governance fiascos of the 1980s and 1990s,
respectively, Congress and courts must act swiftly and decisively.
The reforms set forth in this article would go a long way toward
compelling full transparency and accountability. Sarbanes-Oxley
is instructive on this point. As people with first-hand knowledge
of corporate practices, employees must be empowered to identify
and report suspected violations without fear of retribution.
Similarly, beneficiaries - whether current employees of the
companies at issue or not - need meaningful recourse via private
enforcement actions to address any ERISA violations. The efficacy
of this approach would obviously depend on fortified disclosure,
funding, and auditing requirements as well as the closure of
corporate loopholes.
In some sense, the proposed reforms could be viewed as
costly. Even if that were true, continuing to tinker at ERISA's
margins will be far more costly in the long run - both in economic
and in social terms.
We cannot afford, both literally and
figuratively, to delay true reform any further.

